|
The
Intellectual Origins Of America-Bashing
By Lee Harris
specter haunts the world, and that specter is
America. This is not the America discoverable in the pages of a world
atlas, but a mythical America that is the target of the new form of
anti-Americanism that Salman Rushdie, writing in the Guardian
(February 6, 2002), says “is presently taking
the world by storm” and that forms the subject of a Washington Post
essay by Martin Kettle significantly entitled “U.S. Bashing: It’s All
The Rage In Europe” (January 7, 2002). It is
an America that Anatol Lieven assures us, in a recent article in the
London Review of Books, is nothing less than “a menace to itself and
to mankind” and that Noam Chomsky has repeatedly characterized as the
world’s major terrorist state.
But above all it is the America that is responsible for the evils of
the rest of the world. As Darius Fo, the winner of the
1997 Nobel Prize for literature, put it in a
notorious post-September 11 email subsequently
quoted in the New York Times (September 22,
2001): “The great speculators [of American capitalism] wallow in
an economy that every years kills tens of millions of people with
poverty [in the Third World] — so what is 20,000
dead in New York? Regardless of who carried out the massacre [of
9-11], this violence is the legitimate
daughter of the culture of violence, hunger and inhumane exploitation.”
It is this sort of America that is at the hub of Antonio Negri and
Michael Hardt’s revision of Marxism in their intellectually influential
book Empire (Harvard University Press, 2000)
— a reinterpretation of historical materialism in which the global
capitalist system will be overthrown not by those who have helped to
create it, namely, the working class, but rather by a polyglot global
social force vaguely referred to as “the multitude” — the alleged
victims of this system.
America-bashing is anti-Americanism at its most radical and
totalizing. Its goal is not to advise, but to condemn; not to fix, but
to destroy. It repudiates every thought of reform in any normal sense;
it sees no difference between American liberals and American
conservatives; it views every American action, both present and past, as
an act of deliberate oppression and systemic exploitation. It is not
that America went wrong here or there; it is that it is wrong root and
branch. The conviction at the heart of those who engage in it is really
quite simple: that America is an unmitigated evil, an irredeemable
enormity.
This is the specter that is haunting the world today. Indeed, one may
even go so far as to argue that this America is the fundamental
organizing principle of the left as it exists today: To be against
America is to be on the right side of history; to be for it is to be on
the wrong side.
But let’s pause to ask a question whose answer the America-bashers
appear to assume they know: What is the right side of history at
this point in history?
The concept of a right side of history is derived from Marxism, and
it is founded on the belief that there is a forward advance toward a
socialist future that can be resisted, but not ultimately defeated. But
does anyone believe this anymore? Does anyone take seriously the claim
that the present state of affairs will be set aside and a wholly new
order of things implemented in its place, and that such a transformation
of the world will happen as a matter of course?
And, finally, if in fact there are those who believe such a thing,
what is the status of this belief? Is it a realistic assessment of the
objective conditions of the present world order, or is it merely wishful
thinking?
Marx’s political realism
he
importance of these questions should be obvious to anyone
familiar with the thought of Marx. Marx’s uniqueness as a thinker of the
left is his absolute commitment to the principles of political
realism. This is the view that any political energy that is put into
what is clearly a hopeless cause is a waste. Utopianism is not only
impractical; it is an obstacle to obtaining socialism’s true objective,
since it diverts badly needed resources away from the pursuit of viable
goals, wasting them instead on the pursuit of political fantasies.
The concept of fantasy as a political category assumed its central
place in Marxist thought in The Communist Manifesto, where Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels used it as the distinguishing mark of their
own brand of socialism: It was this that condemned all previous forms of
socialism to the realm of vague dreams and good intentions, and which
gave Marxism the claim to be a “scientific” form of socialism.
Marx’s use of the term “scientific” in this text has often been
criticized. But, in his defense, it should be remembered that the German
Wissenschaft describes a far wider category than the English
“science.” It means what we know as opposed to what we merely opine, or
feel, or imagine; the objective as opposed to the subjective; realistic
thinking as opposed to impractical daydreaming. And it is in this last
sense that Marx and Engels use it: For the opposite of the scientific is
none other than the utopian.
This is the basis of Marx’s condemnation of all forms of utopian
socialism, the essence of which is the enormous gap between the
“fantastic pictures of future society” the utopian socialist dreams of
achieving, on one hand, and any realistic assessment of the objective
conditions of the actual social order on the other.
This concept of fantasy as “fantastic pictures” inside the head of
impractical daydreamers is a classic theme of German Romantic literature
and is perhaps most closely identified with the characters of E.T.A.
Hoffman’s stories, such as Kapellmeister Kreisler. The fantasist, in
this literature, is a character type: He lives in his own dream world
and can manage only the most tenuous relationship to the real world
around him. But, unlike the character type of the absent-minded
professor, the Romantic fantasist is not content to putter around in his
own world. Instead, he is forever insisting that his world is the real
one, and in the process of doing this, he reduces the real world around
him, and the people in it, to an elaborate stage setting for the
enactment of his own private fantasies.
Marx and Engels’s wholesale condemnation of all previous socialism as
utopian fantasy is the fundamental innovation of their own work.
It is the basis of their claim to be taken seriously, not merely by
Hoffmanesque daydreamers, but by men of practical judgment and shrewd
common sense. To fail to make this distinction, or to fail to stay on
the right side of this distinction once it has been made, is to cease to
be a Marxist and to fall back into mere Träumerei.
This demarcation line arose because Marx believed that he had grasped
something that no previous utopian socialist had even suspected. He
believed that he had shown that socialism was inevitable and that it
would come about through certain ironclad laws of history — laws that
Marx believed were revealed through the study of the very nature of
capitalism. Socialism, in short, would not come about because a handful
of daydreamers had wished for it, or because pious moralists had urged
it, but because the unavoidable breakdown of the capitalist system would
force the turn to socialism upon those societies that, prior to this
breakdown, had been organized along capitalist lines.
Schematically the scenario went something like this:
• The capitalists would begin to suffer from a falling rate of
profit.
• The workers would therefore be “immiserized”; they would become
poorer as the capitalists struggled to keep their own heads above water.
• The poverty of the workers would drive them to overthrow the
capitalist system — their poverty, not their ideals.
What is interesting here is that, once you accept the initial premise
about the falling rate of profit, the rest does indeed follow
realistically. Now, this does not mean that it follows necessarily
or according to an ironclad scientific law; but it certainly conveys
what any reasonable person would take as the most probable outcome of a
hypothetical failure of capitalism.
For Marx it is absolutely essential that revolutionary activities be
justifiable on realistic premises. If they cannot be, then they are
actions that cannot possibly have a real political objective — and
therefore, their only value can be the private emotional or spiritual
satisfaction of the people carrying out this pseudo-political action.
So in order for revolutionary activity to have a chance of
succeeding, there is an unavoidable precondition: The workers must have
become much poorer over time. Furthermore, there had to be not merely an
increase of poverty, but a conviction on the part of the workers that
their material circumstances would only get worse, and not better — and
this would require genuine misery.
This is the immiserization thesis of Marx. And it is central to
revolutionary Marxism, since if capitalism produces no widespread
misery, then it also produces no fatal internal contradiction: If
everyone is getting better off through capitalism, who will dream of
struggling to overthrow it? Only genuine misery on the part of the
workers would be sufficient to overturn the whole apparatus of the
capitalist state, simply because, as Marx insisted, the capitalist class
could not be realistically expected to relinquish control of the state
apparatus and, with it, the monopoly of force. In this, Marx was
absolutely correct. No capitalist society has ever willingly liquidated
itself, and it is utopian to think that any ever will. Therefore, in
order to achieve the goal of socialism, nothing short of a complete
revolution would do; and this means, in point of fact, a full-fledged
civil war not just within one society, but across the globe. Without
this catastrophic upheaval, capitalism would remain completely in
control of the social order and all socialist schemes would be reduced
to pipe dreams.
The immiserization thesis, therefore, is critical to Marx, for
without it there would be no objective conditions in response to which
workers might be driven to overthrow the capitalist system. If the
workers were becoming better off with time, then why jump into an
utterly untested and highly speculative economic scheme? Especially when
even socialists themselves were bitterly divided over what such a scheme
would be like in actual practice. Indeed, Marx never committed himself
to offering a single suggestion about how socialism would actually
function in the real world.
Immiserization goes global
y
the twentieth century the immiserization thesis was already
beginning to look shaky. Empirical evidence, drawn either by
impressionistic observation or systematic statistical studies, began to
suggest that there was something wrong with the classical version of the
thesis, and an attempt was made to save it by redefining immiserization
to mean not an absolute increase in misery, but merely a relative one.
This gloss allowed a vast increase in empirical plausibility, since it
accepted the fact that the workers were indeed getting better off under
the capitalist system but went on to argue that they were not getting
better off at the same rate as the capitalists.
The problem with this revision lay not in its economic premises, but
its political ones. Could one realistically believe that workers would
overthrow an economic system that was continually improving their own
lot, simply because that of the capitalist class was improving at a
marginally better rate? Certainly, the workers might envy the
capitalists; but such emotions simply could not supply the gigantic
impetus required to overthrow a structure as massive as the capitalist
system. Before the workers of a capitalist society could unite, they had
to feel that they had literally nothing to lose — nothing to lose but
their proverbial chains. For if they had homes and cars and boats and
rvs to lose as well, then it became quite
another matter.
In short, the relative immiserization thesis was simply not the stuff
that drives people to the barricades. At most it could fuel the
gradualist reforms of the evolutionary ideal of socialism — a position
identified with Eduard Bernstein.
The post-World War II period demolished the last traces of the
classical immiserization thesis. Workers in the most advanced capitalist
countries were prosperous by any standard imaginable, either absolute or
relative; and what is even more important, they felt themselves to be
well off, and believed that the future would only make them and their
children even better off than they had been in the past. This was a
deadly blow to the immiserization thesis and hence to Marxism. For the
failure of the immiserization thesis is in fact the failure of classical
Marxism. If there is no misery, there is no revolution; and if there is
no revolution, there is no socialism. Q.E.D. Socialism goes back once
more to being merely a utopian fantasy.
Yet those who still claim to derive their heritage from Marx are
mostly unwilling to acknowledge that their political aims are merely
utopian, not scientific. How is that possible?
There might be several reasons advanced for this, but certainly one
of them is Paul Baran. A Polish born American economist and a Marxist,
Baran is the author of The Political Economy of Growth (Monthly
Review Press, 1957). In it, for the first time
in Marxist literature, Baran propounded a causal connection between the
prosperity of the advanced capitalist countries and the impoverishment
of the Third World. It was no longer the case, as it was for Marx, that
poverty — as well as idiocy — was the natural condition of man living in
an agricultural mode of production. Rather, poverty had been introduced
into the Third World by the capitalist system. The colonies no longer
served the purpose of consuming overstocked inventories, but were now
the positive victims of capitalism.
What needs to be stressed here is that, prior to Baran, no Marxist
had ever suspected that capitalism was the cause of the poverty of the
rest of the world. Not only had Marx and Engels failed to notice this
momentous fact, but neither had any of their followers. Yet this
omission was certainly not due to Marx’s lack of knowledge about, or
interest in, the question of European colonies. In his writing on India,
Marx shows himself under no illusions concerning the brutal and
mercenary nature of British rule. He is also aware of the “misery and
degradation” effected by the impact of British industry’s “devastating
effects” on India. Yet all of this is considered by Marx to be a
dialectical necessity; that is to say, these effects were the
unavoidable precondition of India’s progress and advance — an example of
the “creative destruction” that Schumpeter spoke of as the essence of
capitalist dynamics. Or, as Marx put it in On Colonialism: “[T]he
English bourgeoisie . . . will neither emancipate nor materially mend
the social condition of the mass of the [Indian] people . . . but . . .
what they will not fail to do is to lay down the material premises for
both” the emancipation and the mending of this social condition.
The radical nature of Baran’s reformulation of Marxist doctrine is
obscured by an understandable tendency to confuse Baran’s theory with
Lenin’s earlier theory of imperialism. In fact, the two have nothing in
common. Lenin’s theory had evolved in order to explain the continuing
survival of capitalism into the early twentieth century, and hence the
delay of the coming of socialism. In Lenin’s view, imperialism is not
the cause of Third World immiserization, but rather a stopgap means of
postponing immiserization in the capitalist countries themselves. It is
the capitalist countries’ way of keeping their own work force relatively
prosperous — and hence politically placid — by selling surplus goods
into captive colonial markets. It is not a way of exploiting, much less
impoverishing, these colonies. It was rather a way “to bribe the upper
strata of the proletariat, and . . . to . . . strengthen opportunism,”
as Lenin put it in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism
(International Publishers, 1933).
This gives us the proper perspective from which to judge the
revolutionary quality of Baran’s reformulation. For, in essence, what
Baran has done is to globalize the traditional doctrine of
immiserization so that, instead of applying to the workers of the
advanced capitalist countries, it now came to apply to the entire
population of those countries that have not achieved advanced
capitalism: It was the rest of the world that was being impoverished by
capitalism, not the workers of the advanced countries.
Baran’s global immiserization thesis, after its initial launch, was
taken up by other Marxists, but it was nowhere given a more elaborate
intellectual foundation than in Immanuel Wallerstein’s monumental study
The Modern World-System (Academic Press, 1974),
which was essentially a fleshing out in greater historical and
statistical detail of Baran’s thesis. Hence, for the sake of
convenience, I will call the global immiserization thesis the
Baran-Wallerstein revision.
America as “root cause”
hat
i now would like to consider is not the thesis itself, but the
role that this thesis played in bolstering and revitalizing late
twentieth-century Marxism. For it is here that we find the intellectual
origins of the international phenomenon of America-bashing. If there is
any element of genuine seriousness in this movement — if, indeed, it
aspires to be an objective and realistic assessment of the relationship
of America to the rest of the world — then that element of seriousness
is to be found in the global immiserization thesis: America has gotten
rich by making other countries poor.
Furthermore, this is no less true of those who, like Chomsky, have
focused on what is seen as American military aggression against the rest
of the world, for this aggression is understood as having its “root
cause” in America’s systematic exploitation of the remainder of the
human race. If American exploitation did not create misery, it would not
need to use military force. It is the global immiserization thesis that
makes the use of force an indispensable tool of American foreign policy
and that is responsible, according to this view, for turning America
into a terrorist state. This explains the absolute centrality of the
global immiserization thesis in the creation of the specter of America
now haunting so much of our world.
The Baran-Wallerstein revision of the classical immiserization thesis
into its global context was far better adapted to fix what was wrong in
Marxist theory than the revisionist notion of relative immiserization
discussed above. For, as we have seen, what was needed was real misery,
and not merely comparative misery, since without such misery there would
be no breakdown of capitalism: no civil war, no revolution, no
socialism. And who can doubt that great real misery exists in the Third
World?
In addition to providing a new and previously untapped source of
misery, the Baran-Wallerstein revision provided several other benefits.
For example, there was no longer any difficulty in accepting the
astonishingly high level of prosperity achieved by the work force of the
advanced capitalist countries — indeed, it was now even possible to
arraign the workers of these countries alongside of the capitalists for
whom they labored — or, rather, more precisely, with whom they
collaborated in order to exploit both the material resources and the
cheap labor of the Third World. In the new configuration, both the
workers and the capitalists of the advanced countries became the
oppressor class, while it was the general population of the less
advanced countries that became the oppressed — including, curiously
enough, even the rulers of these countries, who often, to the untutored
eye, seemed remarkably like oppressors themselves.
With this demystification of the capitalist working class came an end
to even a feigned enthusiasm among Marxists for solidarity with the
hopelessly middle-class aspirations of the American blue-collar work
force. The Baran-Wallerstein revision offered an exotic new object of
sympathy — namely, the comfortably distant and abstract Third World
victims of the capitalist world system.
Perhaps most important, the Baran-Wallerstein revision also neatly
solved the most pressing dilemma that worker prosperity in advanced
capitalist countries bequeathed to classical Marxism: the absolute lack
of revolutionary spirit among these workers — the very workers, it must
be remembered, who were originally cast in the critical role of world
revolutionaries. In the new theoretical configuration, this problem no
longer mattered simply because the workers of the capitalist countries
no longer mattered.
Hence the appeal of the global immiserization thesis: The
Baran-Wallerstein revision neatly obviates all the most outstanding
objections to the classical Marxist theory. This leaves two questions
unanswered: Is it true? And even if it is true, does it save Marxism?
Whether the immiserization thesis is true or not is simply too
complex a topic to deal with here. Indeed, for the sake of the present
argument, I am willing to assume that it is absolutely true — truer than
anything has ever been true before. For what I want to concentrate on is
the question of whether the Baran-Wallerstein revision is consistent
with Marxism’s claim to represent a realistic political agenda as
opposed to a mere utopian fantasy. And the short answer is that, no
matter how true the global immiserization thesis might be, it does not
save the Baran-Wallerstein revision of Marxism from being condemned as
utopian fantasy — and condemned not by my standards or yours, but by
those of Marx and Engels.
This is because the original immiserization thesis was set within the
context of a class war within a society — an actual civil war
between different classes of one and the same society, and not between
different nations on different continents. This makes an enormous
difference, for it is not at all unreasonable to think that a
revolutionary movement could succeed, by means of a violent and bloody
civil war, in gaining the monopoly of force within a capitalist society,
and thus be able to dictate terms to the routed capitalists, if any
survived.
But this is an utterly different scenario from one in which the most
advanced capitalist societies have a monopoly of force — and brutally
effective force — at their disposal. For in this case it is absurd to
think that the exploited Third World countries could possibly be able to
alter the world order by even a hair, provided the advanced capitalist
societies were intent on not being altered.
What could they do to us?
9-11 calling
he
answer to this question, according to many of those who accept
the global immiserization thesis, came on 9-11.
Noam Chomsky, perhaps America’s most celebrated proponent of the
Baran-Wallerstein thesis, expressed this idea in the immediate
aftermath. Here, for the first time, the world had witnessed the
oppressed finally striking a blow against the oppressor — a politically
immature blow, perhaps, comparable to the taking of the Bastille by the
Parisian mob in its furious disregard of all laws of humanity, but still
an act equally world-historical in its significance: the dawn of a new
revolutionary era.
This judgment can make sense only in the context of the
Baran-Wallerstein thesis. For if 9-11 was in
fact a realistic blow against the advanced capitalist countries — or
even just the most advanced — then here was an escape from the utopian
deadlock of the global immiserization thesis. Here was a way that the
overthrow of world capitalism could be made a viable historical outcome
once again, and not merely the fantastic delusions of a sect. This
explains the otherwise baffling valorization of 9-11
on the part of the left — by which I mean the enormous world-historical
significance that they have been prepared to attribute to al Qaeda’s act
of terror.
But was 9-11 truly world-historical in the
precise sense required to sustain the Baran-Wallerstein revision? For
9-11 to be world-historical in this sense, it
would have to contain within it the seeds of a gigantic shift in the
order of things: something on the scale of the decline and collapse of
capitalist America and with it the final realization of the socialist
realm.
But this investment of world-historical significance to
9-11 is simply wishful thinking on the part of
the left. It is an effort to transform the demented acts of a group of
fantasists into the vanguard of the world revolution. Because if there
is to be a world revolution at all there has to be a vanguard of that
revolution, an agent whose actions are such as to represent a threat to
the capacity of the capitalist system simply to survive. This means that
it is not enough to injure it; it is not enough to wound or madden it;
it is not enough to rouse it to rage — the agent must kill it, too. He
must be capable of overthrowing the hegemonic power at the center of the
capitalist world system.
But this is absolutely implausible. Any realistic assessment of any
possible scenario will inevitably conclude that nothing that al Qaeda
can do can cause the collapse of America and the capitalist system. The
worse eventuality in the long run would be that America would be forced
to break its hallowed ideal of universal tolerance, in order to make an
exception of those who fit the racial profiling of an al Qaeda
terrorist. It is ridiculous to think that if al Qaeda continued to
attack us such measures would not be taken. They would be forced upon
the government by the people (and anyone who thinks that the supposed
cultural hegemony of the left might stop this populist fury is deluded).
In other words, the only effect on America of a continuation of
September 11-style attacks would be an
increasingly repressive state apparatus domestically and a populist home
front demand for increasingly severe retaliation against those nations
supporting or hiding terrorists. But neither one of these reactions
would seriously undermine the strength of the United States — indeed, it
is quite evident that further attacks would continue to unite the
overwhelming majority of the American population, creating an
irresistible “general will” to eradicate terrorism by any means
necessary, including the most brutal and ruthless.
But this condition, let us recall, is precisely the opposite of the
objective political conditions that, according to Marx, must be present
in order for capitalism to be overthrown. For classical Marxism demands,
quite realistically, a state that is literally being torn apart by
internal dissension. Revolution, in short, requires a full-fledged civil
war within the capitalist social order itself, since nothing
short of this can possibly achieve the goal that the revolution is
seeking. Hence, 9-11-style attacks that serve
only to strengthen the already considerable solidarity between classes
in the United States are, from the perspective of classical Marxism,
fatally flawed. For such attacks not only fail to further any
revolutionary aims; they actually make the revolution less probable. A
society of 300 million individuals whose
bumper stickers say “United We Stand” is not a breeding ground for
revolutionary activity. Nor is it a society that can be easily
intimidated into mending its ways, even if we make the assumption that
its ways need mending.
But if the result of 9-11 was to strengthen
the political unity of the United States, then 9-11
was definitely not world-historical. The unspeakable human horror of
9-11 should not blind us to the ghastly
triviality of the motive and the inevitable nullity of the aftermath.
The temptation of fantasy ideology
he
baran-wallerstein revision of Marxism does provide a new global
reformulation of the immiserization thesis. But the locus of this
misery, the Third World, does not and cannot provide an adequate
objective foundation for a revolutionary struggle against the capitalist
system. Rather, this foundation can be provided only by a majority of
the workers in the advanced capitalist countries themselves; but, as we
have seen, the effect of 9-11 on the working
class of the United States was not one conducive to the overthrow and
demise of capitalism. On the contrary, nowhere was the desire to
retaliate against the terrorists more powerfully visceral than among the
working class of the United States. The overwhelming majority of its
members instantly responded with collective and spontaneous expression
of solidarity with other Americans and expressions of outrage against
those who had planned and carried out the attack, as well as those who
attempted to palliate it.
For those who are persuaded by the Baran-Wallerstein thesis,
9-11 represents a classic temptation. It is
the temptation that every fantasy ideology offers to those who become
caught up in it — the temptation to replace serious thought and
analysis, fidelity to the facts and scrupulous objectivity, with the
worst kind of wishful thinking. The attempt to cast
9-11 as a second taking of the Bastille simply overlooks what is
most critical about both of these events, namely, that the Bastille was
a symbol of oppression to the masses of French men and women who first
overthrew it and then tore it down, brick by brick. And while it is true
that the Bastille had become the stuff of fantasy, thanks to the pre-1789
“horrors of the Bastille” literature, it was still a fantasy that worked
potently on the minds of the Parisian mob and hence provided the
objective political conditions necessary to undermine the Bourbon state.
But the fantasy embodied in 9-11, far from
weakening the American political order, strengthened it immeasurably,
while the only mobs that were motivated by the enactment of this fantasy
were those inhabiting the Arab streets — a population pathetically
unable to control even the most elementary aspects of its own political
destiny, and hence scarcely the material out of which a realistically
minded revolutionary could hope to fashion an instrument of
world-historical transformation. These people are badly miscast in the
role of the vanguard of the world revolution. And what can we say about
those in the West, allegedly acting within the tradition of Marxist
thought, who encourage such spectacularly utopian flights of fantasy?
The Baran-Wallerstein thesis cannot save Marxism; and, in fact, it is
a betrayal of what is genuinely valid in Marx — namely, the insistence
that any realistic hope of a world-historical transformation from one
stage of social organization to a more humane one can come only if men
and women do not yield to the temptation of fantasy ideology, even —
and, indeed, especially — when it is a fantasy ideology dressed up to
look like Marxism.
Instead, the Baran-Wallerstein thesis has sadly come to provide
merely a theoretical justification for the most irrational and infantile
forms of America-bashing. There is nothing Marxist about this. On the
contrary, according to Marx, it was the duty of the non-utopian
socialist, prior to the advent of genuine socialism, to support whatever
state happened to represent the most fully developed and consistently
carried out form of capitalism; and, indeed, it was his duty to defend
it against the irrational onslaughts of those reactionary and backward
forces that tried to thwart its development. In fact, this was a duty
that Marx took upon himself, and nowhere more clearly than in his
defense of the United States against the Confederacy in the Civil War.
Only in this case he was defending capitalism against a fantasy ideology
that, unlike that of radical Islam, wished to roll back the clock a mere
handful of centuries, not several millennia.
Those who, speaking in Marx’s name, try to defend the fantasy
ideology embodied in 9-11 are betraying
everything that Marx represented. They are replacing his hard-nosed
insistence on realism with a self-indulgent flight into sheer fantasy,
just as they are abandoning his strenuous commitment to pursuit of a
higher stage of social organization in order to glorify the feudal
regimes that the world has long since condemned to Marx’s own celebrated
trash bin of history.
America-bashing has sadly come to be “the opium of the intellectual,”
to use the phrase Raymond Aron borrowed from Marx in order to
characterize those who followed the latter into the twentieth century.
And like opium it produces vivid and fantastic dreams.
This is an intellectual tragedy. The Marxist left, whatever else one
might say about it, has traditionally offered a valuable perspective
from which even the greatest conservative thinkers have learned —
including Schumpeter and Thomas Sowell. But if it cannot rid itself of
its current penchant for fantasy ideology of the worst type, not only
will it be incapable of serving this purpose; it will become worse than
useless. It will become a justification for a return to that state of
barbarism mankind has spent millennia struggling to transcend — a
struggle that no one felt more keenly than Marx himself. For the essence
of utopianism, according to Marx, is the refusal to acknowledge just how
much suffering and pain every upward step of man’s ascent inflicts upon
those who are taking it, and instead to dream that there are easier ways
of getting there. There are not, and it is helpful to no party to
pretend that there are. To argue that the great inequalities of wealth
now existing between the advanced capitalist countries and the Third
World can be cured by outbreaks of frenzied and irrational
America-bashing is not only utopian; it is immoral.
The left, if it is not to condemn itself to become a fantasy
ideology, must reconcile itself not only with the reality of America,
but with its dialectical necessity — America is the sine qua non of any
future progress that mankind can make, no matter what direction that
progress may take.
The belief that mankind’s progress, by any conceivable standard of
measurement recognized by Karl Marx, could be achieved through the
destruction or even decline of American power is a dangerous delusion.
Respect for the deep structural laws that govern the historical process
— whatever these laws may be — must dictate a proportionate respect for
any social order that has achieved the degree of stability and
prosperity the United States has achieved and has been signally decisive
in permitting other nations around the world to achieve as well. To
ignore these facts in favor of surreal ideals and utterly utopian
fantasies is a sign not merely of intellectual bankruptcy, but of a
disturbing moral immaturity. For nothing indicates a failure to
understand the nature of a moral principle better than to believe that
it is capable of enforcing itself.
It is not. It requires an entire social order to shelter and protect
it. And if it cannot find these, it will perish.
Feedback? Email
polrev@hoover.stanford.edu.
Or send us a Letter
to the Editor.
|